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Walker: Insurance

INSURANCE
W Suy WALXER*
Those cases from South Carolina during the preceding year
which primarily involved the field of insurance were characterized by some rather unique factual situations as well as by the
establishment and reaffirmation of certain important legal principles, the most significant example of which is probably the case
of Sexton v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co.' In this case the plaintiff's car was stolen and, while stolen, caused certain damage to
the property of four people who thereupon instituted suit against
the plaintiff and attached his car at the same time. The plaintiff
was judicially relieved of personal liability; but a judgment in
-remwas rendered against the auto, and plaintiff paid the property owners 800.00 dollars in settlement to secure a release of
his car. The company had agreed to indemnify the plaintiff
against loss which he became "legally obligated to pay," and
controversy arose as to whether or not he was "legally obligated"
to pay the 800.00 dollars to release the car from attachment. The
county court held that the company was not liable; the Court
of Common Pleas reversed that holding and ruled in the plaintiff's favor; and the Supreme Court again reversed and held for
the company.
The court reasoned that, whils a judgment in personam creates
personal liability, a judgment in rem operates only upon the
subject property. The auto here was liable, not the owner, and
the statutory lien on the auto under Section 45-55 of the 1962
Code did not constitute a judgment against the plaintiff. Since
the company agreed to pay only when the plaintiff became legally
obligated, and since this was to be determined by whether or not
a valid judgment had been rendered against him, its liability did
not accrue under the in rem judgment.
Mr. Justice Bussey, dissenting, stated that in his opinion the
statutory lien created a legal debt or duty on the part of the
owner to pay to the extent of the automobile itself or its value at
the time of the attachment and that the judgment gave plaintiff
the choice of paying or surrendering his auto. Justice Bussey
stated that in either event, the plaintiff was legally obligated to
pay the equivalent of 800.00 dollars.
* Member of the firm of Leatherwood, Walker, Todd & Mann, Greenville,
South Carolina.

1. 242 S.C. 182, 130 S.E.2d 475 (1963).
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Another important decision extended the use of the so-called
"loan receipt" theory. The companion cases of Othella D. Martin
v. Henry J. McLeod 2 and Joseph B. Martin, Jr. v. Henry J. MLeod3 were instituted by the plaintiffs against a party allegedly
responsible for a fire which damaged plaintiff's dwelling and
contents therein. The defendant asserted in the Court of Common Pleas that the plaintiffs were not in fact the real parties in
interest since they had both been compensated through their
insurer for their respective losses, and at best these were actually
assignments of causes of action. From judgments in favor of the
plaintiffs, the defendant appealed.
The essential issue in each case was whether or not there had
been an unconditional payment as compensation for loss, or whether the insurance company and its insureds, by virtue of what
is commonly known as a "loan receipt," in effect suspended the
right of subrogation and left the title to the causes of action in
the two insureds.
In resolving this question in favor of the plaintiffs, the court
cited the landmark case of Lucekenbach v. W. L. McCahan Sugar
Refining Co.," which upheld the validity of the "loan receipt."
The court went on to say that, although some jurisdictions
strictly confined the application of the Lucekenbach case to situations involving contingent liability on the part of the insurer,
South Carolina and the weight of authority do not so limit this
principle. The "loan receipt" was thus a lawful device by which
subrogation was avoided and under which the plaintiffs in the
two cases were entitled to bring the action in their own names.
The opinion rendered in Gibson v. Glens Falls Ins. (o. 5 is also
quite significant although it will probably be controlling only in
cases having very similar factual situations. The action was by an
insured against an insurer to recover under a policy of manufacturers' and contractors' liability insurance under which the
defendant agreed to pay all sums within the policy limits for
which the plaintiff became legally obligated to pay due to injury,
harm, or loss of property arising out of the plaintiff's business
operation, but excluding coverage for injury or destruction of
"property in the care, custody or control of the insured or prop2. 241 S.C. 71, 127 S.E.2d 129 (1962).

This case is also noted in the

Pleading section at note 22.
3. 241 S.C. 76, 127 S.E.2d 131 (1962).

4. 248 U.S. 139, 63 L. Ed 170 (1918).
5. 241 S.C. 293, 128 S.E2d 157 (1962). Recent Decision, 15 S.C.L.
722 (1963).
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erty as to which the insured for any purpose is exercising physicaZ control."
The plaintiff was a contractor whose employees were cleaning
a swimming pool. The employees had left the pool at about four
o'clock one afternoon with the intention of finishing the job the
following morning. However, when they returned to the site the
next day, they discovered that the floor of the pool had risen
some 15 inches. Efforts to rectify the situation were only partially successful, and ultimately the owner of the pool brought
an action against the plaintiff who was forced to settle the claim
and pay attorneys' fees on his own behalf, the defendant insurer
at all times denying liability on the basis of the above stated
exclusion. In an action by the plaintiff to recover on the policy,
the lower court granted the defendant's motion for a directed
verdict and the plaintiff appealed.
The sole question was whether the swimming pool in question
was in the care, custody or control of the plaintiff at the time
of the loss. The court's answer was negative and the judgment
was reversed and remanded. The court said that since the plaintiff and its employees had left the pool, all plaintiff had was
the right of access to return the following morning and that
care, custody and control of property contemplates something
stronger than mere right of access.
The remaining cases have been divided into categories depending upon the significant principles or issues involved therein.
CONSTRUCTION OF POLICY
Significant in this category is the case of Garrett v. Pilot Life
Ins. Co." in which plaintiff brought an action on a scholastic
accident insurance policy which provided benefits for accidental
injuries occurring while
traveling directly between home and school for the purpose
of attending or returning from regularly scheduled classes,
but only if such travel occurred within one hour before the
commencement of the day's school session or within one hour
after dismissal from school.
On the day in question, the plaintiff was dismissed from school
early and stopped at the residence of a neighbor who lived between the school and plaintiff's home and who was taking care
6. 241 S.C. 299, 128 S.E2d 171 (1962).
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of plaintiff's younger brother and sister. He drank a glass of
lemonade and then a short time later asked the permission of
the neighbor to play with a BB gun. Permission was granted
and plaintiff was in the act of loading the gun when it was
somehow discharged and his eye injured. This accident occurred
about forty-five minutes after he had been dismissed from school.
A trial by jury was waived and the case submitted to the court
upon an agreed stipulation of facts. The trial judge found that,
although the accident occurred within one hour after the plaintiff had been dismissed from school, every stipulated fact indicated a complete abandonment of any intention of traveling
home; and, accordingly, the trial judge held that the accident
was not covered under the provisions of the policy. Upon appeal,
the Supreme Court affirmed, stating that the trial judge had
reached a conclusion of which the facts were reasonably susceptible and that his findings of fact were, therefore, binding.
Another interesting case pertaining to policy construction is
that of Barnill v. Bankers Fire & Marine Ins. Co.7 in which
the plaintiff owned a 36.3 acre farm upon which he resided. He
subsequently purchased an adjoining farm of 108.5 acres with a
seven room tenant house thereon and gave a mortgage on the
combined farms, being a total of 144.8 acres. The mortgagee required the plaintiff to obtain fire insurance on his residence
and on the tenant house in the amounts of $8,000 and $500
respectively. Upon the plaintiff's request, the defendant insurance company issued a policy wherein the amounts of coverage on the two buildings were stated as follows: $8,000.00 on one
story frame, composition roof main dwelling occupied by owner
....

$500.00 on 7 room, comp. frame, tenant dwelling, situated

1200 feet N of main dwelling." The acreage of the farm referred
to in the policy was incorrectly entered as 108.5 rather than 144.8.
The tenant house burned and the controversy between the
parties arose over the identity of the building referred to in the
policy as the "main dwelling, occupied by the owner." The
plaintiff contended that, since the acreage in the farm on which
the buildings were located was shown in the policy as 108.5 acres
and the building which burned was the main dwelling on that
tract, the amount of insurance coverage under the policy was
8,000 dollars. On the other hand, the defendant contended that
the building which burned was that designated in the policy as a
7. 240 S.C. 325, 125 S.E.2d 889 (1962).
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"7 room tenant dwelling" and was only insured for $500.00.
The trial court rendered judgment on an $8,000 verdict for the
plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.
In reducing the amount of the judgment to $500.00, the
Supreme Court noted that there was only one building located
on plaintiff's property "occupied by the owner," and that building was not destroyed by fire. There was only one "seven room
tenant dwelling," and that was the one destroyed by fire and
occupied at the time by a tenant, never by the plaintiff owner.
The court pointed out that while the policy refers to the acreage
in the farm as 108.5, this was patently an error under all the
testimony, as it is conceded that some of the buildings insured
were located on the 36.3 acre tract and some on the 108.5 parcel.
In this regard, the court said:
The acreage in the farm is not the subject of the insurance,
but the buildings located thereon. The acreage relates solely
to the location of the insured property and any misstatement
of the acreage in the farm on which the buildings were located was immaterial in this case, since the location and
identity of the insured buildings could be clearly ascertained
from the other language used in the policy in the light of
attendant circumstances.
Linder v. Firemen's Ins. Co.8 was an action by an insured to
recover for damage by windstorm to trees on his residential premises. Attached to and made a part of the subject policy was a
form which stated that the perils insured against were "all risks
of physical loss to the property covered except as otherwise
excluded." Under the provision entitled "PROPERTY AND
INTERESTS COVERED" the plaintiff's dwelling and certain
appurtenances and equipment were included, but trees, shrubs,
plants or lawns were excluded "except as provided elsewhere in
this form." Under the section entitled "EXTENSIONS OF
COVERAGE" certain limited coverage was provided against
the loss of trees by fire, lightning, smoke and other enumerated
perils which, however, did not include windstorm.
The plaintiff contended that the word "windstorm" could be
substituted for the word "fire" under the "EXTENSIONS OF
COVERAGE" clause by reason of the language found in the
comprehensive perils clause as follows:
8. 240 S.C. 331, 125 S.E.2d 645 (1962).

This case is also noted in the

Pleading section at note 4.
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In the application of the provisions of the policy to w7hich
this form is attached, whenever the word fire appears, there
should be substituted the peril involved or the loss caused
thereby, as the case requires.
The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's contention stating
that the word "fire" by which respondent would substitute
"windstorm" does not appear in the policy to which the form is
attached, but appears in a provision of the form itself. The court
went on to say:
It is immaterial that the policy and attached form, together,
constitute the contract of insurance. The italicized words in
the above quoted provision have a distinct and readily understood meaning, which comports with the manifest intention
of the parties, as gathered from the entire contract.
Thus, the court held that the damage to trees by windstorm was
not covered by this insurance contract.
In the case of First Nat'l Bank v. Glens Falls Ins. Co.,9 an
action was instituted by the bank to recover under the terms of
the banker's blanket bond for loss sustained on a loan secured
by fictitious invoices. The notes given for the loan were properly signed by the borrower, but the unsigned invoices which were
attached to the notes and which purported to represent certain
accounts receivable were fictitious. The relevant portion of the
bond in question provided that the insurance company would
indemnify the bank against any loss to the bank's having, in
good faith and in the course of business, extended credit on the
faith of or otherwise acted upon any securities or written instruments which proved to have been counterfeited or forged as
to the signature of any maker.
The district court, citing the decision of the Third Circuit in
Fidelity Trust Co. v. American Sur. Co.,"1 held that the invoices
in question were "counterfeit" and that, therefore, the loss was
covered under the terms of the bond. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, pointing out that
neither the district judge nor the Third Circuit had given adequate consideration to the limitation of the bond which confined
the recovery to losses on securities or written instruments which
proved to have been counterfeited or forged as to the signature.
9. 304 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1962).

10. 268 F.2d 805 (3rd Cir. 1959).
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In examining the language set forth in the bond, the court noted
that there is no comma after the word "counterfeited" and no
other indication that the phrase does not qualify both terms of
evil import. The court also referred to other portions of the bond
which were found to be positive indicationi that it is the counterfeited or forged signature to the fraudulent document rather than
false statements in the document or the falsity of a document
in its entirety which alone gives rise to the liability of the insurer. Since there was no signature at all on the invoices, they
were not covered by the bond.
Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co.11 involved a suit brought to determine the respective liabilities of two insurance companies for
damages resulting from a collision between an automobile and
a tractor-trailer unit. The tractor was covered by a policy issued
by P. T. & F., and the trailer was covered by a policy issued by
Hartford. The owner of the trailer had agreed to pay the owner
of the tractor a certain sum to haul a cargo of gasoline to a certain destination, and an accident had occurred on the return
trip. The district judge held both insurance companies liable and
both appealed. The P. T. & F. policy provided as follows:
Exclusions-This policy does not apply:
(c) Under coverages A and B while the automobile is used
for the pulling of any trailer owned or hired by the insured
and not covered by like insurance in the company; or while
any trailer covered by this policy is used by any automobile
owned or hired by the insured and not covered by like insurance in the company ....
P. T. & F. contended that the trailer was "hired" by its insured
because by its use, the time consumed and costs involved in the
transportation and delivery of the gasoline were reduced. It was
contended that the mutual benefits accruing to the parties from
this arrangement caused the trailer to be hired, thereby excluding
the coverage of P. T. & F.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this contention,
noting that no rental or other compensation had been paid for
the use of the trailer and affirmed the judgment as to P. T. & F.
11. 310 F.2d 618 (4th Cir. 1962).
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The Hartford policy contained the usual omnibus coverage
with respect to persons insured but excluded coverage under the
following circumstances:
The insurance with respect to any person or organization
other than the named insured does not apply under Division
(2) of this insuring agreement.
(a) With respect to an automobile while used with any
trailer owned or hired by the insured and not covered by like
insurance in the company; or with respect to the trailer while
used with any automobile owned or hired by the insured and
not covered by like insurance in the company ....
(d) With respect to any hired automobile, to the owner or
a lessee thereof other than the named insured, or to any agent
or employee of such owner of lessee ....
The Court of Appeals stated that the owner of the tractor
came within the omnibus clause since he was using the trailer
with the permission of its owner. The court determined, however,
that the tractor had been hired by the owner of the trailer and
that this circumstance excluded the tractor owner from coverage
under the Hartford policy. The court also concluded that the
driver of the tractor trailer unit was not acting as agent or employee of the insured under the Hartford policy and that, therefore, there was no coverage on the part of Hartford.
A difficult question of construction was presented by the case
of Baxley v. State Farm Nut. Auto. Liab. Ins. Co.,12 which was
an action to recover funeral benefits under an automobile liability policy. The policy provided coverage while driving a "temporary substitute automobile" which was defined as "an automobile not owned by the named insured." "Named insured" was
defined as including the insured's spouse if residing in the same
household. The deceased insured died while driving an automobile owned wholly by his wife. The company denied coverage
on the basis that the wife, who was living with her husband in
the same household, was thus a named insured, and that, therefore, her automobile could not be construed as a temporary substitute automobile within the terms of the policy, because it was
"owned by the named insured."
In affirming the decision of the lower court in favor of the
plaintiff, our Supreme Court held as follows:
12. 241 S.C. 332, 128 S.E.2d 165 (1962).
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The definition of "named insured" in the policy, and under
the circumstances here involved, simply had the effect of
making "the named insured" two people instead of one.
Since it is conceded that the Chrysler automobile was not
owned by Mr. Baxley, nor by Mr. and Mrs. Baxley jointly,
but only by Mrs. Baxley, it was "not owned by the named insured" and was covered as a temporary substitute automobile
under the provisions of the policy.
The case of Hunter v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Go.' 8
concerned the construction of an automobile liability policy provision excluding coverage with respect to the "death of any member of the family of the insured residing in the same household."
The court held that the decedent came within the exclusion where
it was shown that she had lived with the named insured about
six years and bore him three children although she was not
married to him.
In resolving this question in favor of the defendant insurance
company, the court reasoned that the term "family" as here used
included "such persons as habitually reside under one roof and
form one domestic circle." Since the woman had lived under one
roof with insured and had borne him 6 children she was clearly
a member of his domestic circle and a member of his family and,
as such was excluded from coverage under the policy provision
in question.
REPRESENTATIONS
Section 37-161 of the 1962 Code provides that life insurance
policies shall be incontestable with respect to false representations
after two years from the date of issuance. Section 37471.5 provides that after two years from the date of issuance of an accident
and health policy, no misstatement, except fraudutlent misstatements, may be used to void the policy.
In the case of Culbreth v. Prudence Life Ins. Co.,'14 the question was which of the above statutes applied to a policy insuring
the plaintiff "for loss of life, limb, sight or time caused by sickness." Our Supreme Court held that Section 37-471.5 applied,
thus allowing the insurer to contest the validity of the policy on
the ground of fraudulent misstatement. The court quoted the
13. 241 S.C. 446, 129 S.E.2d 59 (1962).
14. 241 S.C. 46, 127 S.E.2d 132 (1962).
Pleading section at note 17.
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following language from the opinion of the Ohio Court of Appeals in Oglesby-Barnitz Bank & Trust Go. v. Clark :15
Life insurance generally includes the occurrence of death
by accident as one of the conditions which call for payment
by the company, as well as death from other causes. Accidental death policies include only injuries by accident causing death, and to that extent they each provide insurance
of life. Yet, neither of these two kinds of policies is for that
reason brought within the same class of policy. In other
words, in a policy of life insurance, death is the contingency
insured against; and if it be the result of an accident, the
accident is but an incidental factor; while in an accidental
death policy, the accident causing death is the thing insured
against, and the death is but one of the incidents which creates liability.
Using this reasoning, the Supreme Court held that in the instant
case the policy was one of insurance against accident and disability.
Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Beckham'0 was a suit by a life insurer
to rescind two policies issued to the decedent. The plaintiff alleged that the application for the policies was made fraudulent by
misrepresentations and omissions concerning the decedent's medical history. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence and affirmed the judgment for the decedent's beneficiary, stating that
cases of this nature must of necessity stand on their own peculiar facts and the question had been properly submitted to the
jury. The court also reaffirmed the well-established rule that in
such cases it is incumbent upon the insurer to show not only that
the statements complained of were untrue but, in addition, that
their falsity was known to the applicant, that they were material
to the risk, and relied on by the insurer, and that they were made
with the intent to deceive and defraud the company.
In Small v. Coastal States Ins. Co.,'" the defendant insurance
company appealed from a directed verdict on two hospitalization
policies in favor of the plaintiff insured. The defendant contended that there were certain false statements in the application
amounting to warranties and that, therefore, the defendant was
15. 112 Ohio App. 31, 175 N.E.2d 98 (1959).

16. 240 S.C. 450, 126 S.E.2d 342 (1962).

17. 241 S.C. 344, 128 S.B.2d 175 (1962).
Agency section at note 5.

This case is also noted in the
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absolved of any liability to pay. The statement in question was
to the effect that the plaintiff had had no previous stomach
trouble when in fact he had been treated for indigestion caused
by stomach acids prior to his making the application.
In affirming the judgment for the plaintiff, the court noted
that there had been no showing that the plaintiff knowingly
falsified the answers with an intent to deceive the company. The
court referred to its recent decision in Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v.
Beokham,18 where it held that the answers to questions regarding
health were representations and not warranties, and that the
answer, even if false, would not void the policy unless material
to the risk, known by the applicant to be false, made with an
intent to mislead, and relied upon as a basis for issuance of the
policy. In order to deny coverage, the insurer must show all
of these.
The case of Home Fire & Marine Ins. Go. v. Tisdale"9 was a
declaratory action in which the insurance company denied coverage under an automobile liability policy on the ground that the
policy had been issued in reliance on the truth of a representation
which later proved to be false. The insured admitted that the
representation made in the application was false but testified
that the company's agent knew it was false and had directed
the insured to answer in that manner. The agent testified to the
contrary. The policy contained the following conditions:
14. CHANGES. Notice of any agent or knowledge possessed
by any agent or by any other person shall not effect a waiver
or a change in the part of this policy or estop the company
from asserting any right under the terms of this policy; nor
shall the terms of this policy be waived or changed, except
by endorsement issued to form a part of this policy.
17. DECLARATIONS. By acceptance of this policy, the
insured named in Item 1 of the declarations, agrees that the
statements in the declarations are his agreements and representations, that this policy is issued in reliance upon the truth
of such representations, and that this policy embodies all
agreements existing between himself and the company or
any of its agents relating to this insurance.
Notwithstanding these provisions in the policy, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that under the well-established
18. 240 S.C. 450, 126 S.E.2d 342 (1962). Noted supra note 16.

19. 303 F.2d 348, (4th Cir. 1962).
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law in South Carolina, "an insurance company may not set up
forfeiture on account of facts known to the agent of the company to be existing at the time of the making of the contract."
The Court of Appeals noted that the South Carolina court has
gone even further, declaring that the company is charged not
only with notice of what its agent knew, but also with what he
could have known once put upon inquiry by facts disclosed to
him. The court held that in view of the circumstances, a question of fact as to the agent's knowledge was created and should
have been sent to the jury.
SUICIDE
The Supreme Court in the case of Colemant v. Palmetto State
Life Ins. 0o.20 reaffirmed the well-established rules of evidence
that where suit is brought on an accidental death policy, the
burden of proof is on the beneficiary to show the death of the
insured by accident; and when the insurer interposes the defense
of suicide, it has the burden to prove suicide by the preponderance of the evidence. There is a presumption against suicide, but
the presumption is of law and not of fact. When evidence as to
the fact of suicide is introduced, the presumption against suicide
vanishes and the question must be resolved upon the evidence.
Upon reviewing the record, the court concluded that the only
reasonable inference was that the insured had committed suicide.
FRAUD AND DECEIT
The case of Hopkins v. Fidelity Ins. Co. 21 arose under a complaint which alleged that the plaintiff was an illiterate, twentysix year old woman, who was the mother of two minor children.
She had no husband and was entirely dependent for support on
the kindness of relations. One of the children was crushed under
the wheels of a heavy truck owned by B. L. McCaskill and died
within five days. It was further alleged that an agent and adjuster of the defendant company had persuaded plaintiff to accept 2,000.00 dollars for the death of the child under the threat
and guise that the defendant owed her nothing and that, if she
would not sign the release and take the money, "they would pick
up plaintiff's minor brother and put him in bad trouble." It
20. 241 S.C. 384, 128 S.E.2d 699 (1962).

21. 240 S.C. 230, 125 S.E2d 468 (1962).
Pleading section at note 6.

This case is also noted in the
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was contended that the adjuster, acting as agent of the insurance
company, made such representations for the purpose of defrauding tue plaintiff of several thousands of dollars which she
would have been entitled to for the death of her child, and that
by virtue of her executing such release, she thereby forfeited and
lost her legal rights to a fair and just monetary value for the
death of her child. The defendant demurred to the complaint,
alleging that on its face it did not show that any damage was
suffered on the part of the plaintiff. The lower court overruled
the demurrer, but on appeal the Supreme Court reversed and
held that the demurrer should have been sustained upon the
ground that the complaint alleged no damages.
The court pointed out that the action was laid in fraud and
deceit, the claim of damage being founded upon the alleged
loss of plaintiff's right to be adequately compensated monetarily
for the death of her child, and that under our Code, the action
for wrongful death is vested in the deceased child's personal
representative. Her right to compensation was, therefore, not in
her own right, but as beneficiary of a statutory cause of action.
The court further concluded that it was not alleged that the child
had come to its death as a result of the negligent operation of
McCaskill's truck and that the mere allegation that the child was
fatally injured by the truck did not warrant inference of negligence or indicate that the plaintiff or the personal representative
actually had any cause of action.
TRANSGRESSIONS OF AGENT
The defendant in AZZied Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberson2 2 had been,
for a number of years, the general agent for the plaintiff for the
State of South Carolina, employing in that capacity various
sub-agents throughout the state. It became the practice of the
sub-agents to remit their premiums to the defendant, who -would
then deduct his commission and send the balance to the plaintiff.
However, the defendant became delinquent in forwarding his
monthly balances within the time specified in his contract, and
the plaintiff instituted a change whereby the various sub-agents
were to remit directly to the company, thus by-passing the defendant. These billing changes and the naming of company adjusters were the only alterations made in the general agency
agreement, which the plaintiff at the time had no desire to ter22. 306 F.2d 130, (4th Cir. 1962).
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minate. However, the defendant refused to turn over the premiums which he had on hand, and the company terminated the
agreement and brought suit for the premiums held by the defendant. The defendant responded with a counterclaim for a
breach of his agency contract and alleged that he was entitled to
renewals after the termination of the agency. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that there had been no breach of contract since the written agreement between the parties gave no
right to the defendant regarding billing procedures. The court
also held that in the absence of an express agreement between
the parties, and there was none here, an agent is not entitled to
renewals after his agency has been properly terminated.
In McPherson v. United Am. Ins. Co.23 the South Carolina
Supreme Court affirmed the plaintiff's judgment for actual
and punitive damages. The court held the defendant company
liable for fraudulent conversion where its agent received a ful
year's premium from the plaintiff but turned over only the
amount of a quarterly premium to the company which issued a
policy good for three months.
By a rather ingenious argument the defendant contended that
there was no conversion of the plaintiff's property since the
plaintiff actually received what he paid for. Under the well settled rule that if a policy of insurance is issued, the coverage is
for such period of time as could be bought with the amount of
premium paid. The court, in rejecting this argument, pointed
out that while the plaintiff might have been entitled as a matter
of law to treat the policy as valid and in force for the entire
year, he was not bound to pursue this remedy. He could elect, as
he had done, to sue for conversion or for wrongful cancellation.
The court stated that under the doctrine of respondent superior, the defendant was liable for the wrongful conduct of its
agent even though the defendant did not authorize or justify or
participate in, or indeed, know of such misconduct, or even if it
forbade the acts or disapproved of them.
EXPIRATION OF POLICY
Temptron, Inc. v. Dixie Fire & Cas. Co.,24 involved a rather
unique factual situation. Prior to October 1, 1957, Vardry Ram23. 242 S.C. 28, 129 S.E.2d 842 (1963).
Agency section at note 6.
24. 241 S.C. 55, 127 S.E.2d 4 (1962).
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sour was prominent in the ownership and management of two
close corporations, Ramseur's, Inc. and Ramseur Equipment
Company. Vehicles owned by both corporations were insured
under the same policy issued by the defendant company. On
October 1, 1957, however, Mr. Ramseur sold his interest in Ramseur Equipment Company, and the name was changed to Temptron, Inc. The liability policy expired on April 1, 1958. A renewal policy which again named the vehicles of both corporations
was mailed to Mr. Ramseur. Upon receipt of this policy, he
notified the agent of defendant that he wanted insurance only
for Ramseur's, Inc., and the agent accordingly issued an endorsement dated May 12, 1958.
A vehicle owned by Temptron was responsible for a loss which
occurred on May 20, 1958, and the question was whether this loss
was covered under the policy issued to Mr. Ramseur. Temptron,
the plaintiff, contended that the loss was covered under the renewal policy first sent to Mr. Ramseur, as it listed vehicles owned
by both corporations, and since no notice of expiration had been
given to Temptron.
Judgment was entered for the defendant insurance company
and affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court held that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff to renew the policy or to
give notice of expiration. The court said that the renewal policy
sent to Mr. Ramseur was no more than an offer by the insurance
company to make a new contract, which offer was rejected by
Mr. Ramseur who in turn made a counter-proposal. Ramseur
was under no obligation to contract for Temptron's insurance,
and the contract which was finally made did not afford any coverage to Temptron for the loss on May 20, 1958.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

15

